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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Automobiles-Agency--Family Purpose Doctrine-Wife's Liability for Husband's Negligence
In Snall v. Mallory- the plaintiff's automobile was damaged in a
collision with an automobile driven by defendant's husband. The jury
found the husband negligent. On the issue of defendant's liability the
husband, as witness for the plaintiff, testified substantially as follows:
His wife had purchased the car three years before the accident; it had
not been purchased for cash, but had been financed and re-financed; both
he and his wife had been working when the car was purchased; she had
paid the taxes on the car, made several initial installment payments, and,
together with him, had paid repair bills up until the time she had stopped
working. However, his wife had not worked for "about three years,"
and while she was not working he had made all installment payments
and had paid the usual expenses incurred in operating an automobile.
Both he and his wife had used the car for their pleasure and convenience.
The question on appeal was whether, under these facts, the trial court
committed error in submitting the case to the jury on the wife's liability
for her husband's negligence under the family purpose doctrine2. The
court affirmed a judgment for the plaintiff. One justice dissented on
the ground that the husband, and not the wife, had provided and maintained the automobile for his own and the family's use. "A realistic
evaluation of the evidence indicates that through financing and refinancing he was making payments, similar to rentals, to retain the possession and use of the car."3
The family purpose doctrine has been used to assure recovery by an
outsider when a financially irresponsible member of a family causes
injury by his negligent operation of the family car.4 The doctrine is an
'250
N.C. 570, 108 S.E.2d 852 (1959).
2 Since N.C. GEn. STAT. § 20-71.1 (1953), which establishes a prima fade case
of agency on proof of ownership, was not used by the plaintiff, the case went to
the jury on the family purpose doctrine alone. Letter from Mr. John L. Rendleman, attorney for plaintiff, September 30, 1959.
250 N.C. at 575, 108 S.E.2d at 855.
'The importance of the doctrine in North Carolina has been greatly reduced by
the Financial Responsibility Act, N.C. GEx. STAT. § 20-227 (1953), which requires
all automobile owners to carry liability insurance and writes into liability policies
a provision whereby anyone using the car with the insured's consent, either express
or implied, is himself insured. However, one can imagine at least two situations in
which the plaintiff would still want to join the member of the family who might be
liable under the family purpose doctrine, notwithstanding the Financial Responsibility Act. The first is where the extent of the plaintiff's damages appears to be
more than the minimum amount of liability insurance required by the act and the
tort-feasor is himself "judgment proof." Unless the plaintiff invokes the doctrine,
he may get a substantial judgment only to discover that a large part of it is uncollectible because of the driver's insolvency. The second is where the family auto-
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superior,5

extension of the principle of respondeat
the theory of the
doctrine being that some member of the family has made it his business
to provide transportation in the form of an automobile for himself and
for other members of the family. Thus when the car is being used to
transport a member of the family it is being used in the business of the
providing member. Under this reasoning the ordinary rules of agency
are applied. Therefore, if a plaintiff is successful in casting a financially
responsible family member in the role of master, the collectibility of his
judgment is assured. The doctrine is of comparatively late vintage,0
and, although it could be applied with equal logic to any item furnished
for family use, it has been confined to automobiles. 7
In North Carolina the family purpose doctrine was first recognized in
1918.8 Since that time, fairly well-established rules have attended its
application. A plaintiff in order to invoke the doctrine must allege and
prove that the car was customarily used by the family as a generalpurpose vehicle,9 and that at the time of injury it was being used' ° by an
authorized family member within the scope of his authority.1
Assuming these factors to be present, which member of the family
is to be held liable under the doctrine? Although the court has frequently stated the rule in terms of a liability of the head of the household, 12 it has not been necessary to show that the defendant was in fact
the head of the household to obtain a judgment against him.' 3 The fact
that one is the head of the household is a factor to be considered in
mobile involved was owned by an uninsured citizen of a state having no financial
responsibility act. In this situation under the prevailing conflicts of law rule the
doctrine as applied in North Carolina could be used by the plaintiff to hold the
"providing" member of the tort-feasor's family liable for his damages if it appeared
that the tort-feasor himself was financially irresponsible. Cronenberg v. United
States, 123 F. Supp. 693 (E.D.N.C. 1954); Goode v. Barton, 238 N.C. 492, 78
S.E.2d 398 (1953).
'Lyon v. Lyon, 205 N.C. 326, 171 S.E. 356 (1933).
' One of the first cases applying the doctrine was Daily v. Maxwell, 152 Mo.

App. 415, 133 S.W. 351 (1911).

See, e.g., Felcyn v. Gamble, 185 Minn. 357, 241 N.W. 37 (1932), where the
niajoritv of the Minnesota court refused to apply the doctrine to motorboats.
8
Clark v. Sweaney, 176 N.C. 529, 97 S.E. 474 (1918).
' Grier v. Woodside, 200 N.C. 759, 158 S.E. 491 (1931), held that the burden
is on the plaintiff to show that the car was used for family purposes. This proof
gets his case to the jury. The burden then shifts to defendant to show that at the
time of injury the driver was not using it for such purposes.
"0Goss v. Williams, 196 N.C. 213, 145 S.E. 169 (1928), held the husband liable
where a third party was driving at the wife's request. Thus it is not necessary to
the invocation of the doctrine that a family member be driving the car. It need
only be driven in the interest of the family.

I " In Vaughn v. Booker, 217 N.C. 479, 8 S.E.2d 603 (1940), it was held proper

to instruct the jury to find for defendant father if it believed he had forbidden his
son to drive in Raleigh, the site of the accident.
'-See, e.g., Watts v. Lefler, 190 N.C. 722, 130 S.E. 630 (1925).
'8 In Goode v. Barton, 238 N.C. 492, 78 S.E.2d 398 (1953), the wife was held
liable under the family purpose doctrine for the negligent operation of an automobile
without any mention of who was the head of the household.
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fixing liability, but not a conclusive one. It seems that the true test for
determining which member of the family is to be held liable under the
then is
doctrine is one of control. The basic question to be determined
14
who controls the car, not who is the head of the household.
The factors of ownership and maintenance have been used as a further guide in determining which member of the family controls the car.' 5
In Matthews v. Cheatham'6 the court had before it the following situation: A minor child had won the family car in a newspaper contest; it
was registered in her name; the father had paid all costs of maintaining
the car. The mother was adjudged negligent while driving the car
alone. The court, in holding the father liable under the family purpose
doctrine, said that the one who owns, maintains or controls an automobile for family use is the one responsible for its negligent operation.
Thus the father was held liable, in spite of the fact that his daughter
held legal title to the car, on the ground that he maintained and controlled it. Then in Goode v. Barton 7 it was expressly held immaterial
whose funds were used to purchase the car, since liability under the
doctrine "is not confined to owner or driver ... [but] depends upon
control and use.""' The "use" referred to here can only mean that use
for which the car was bought, i.e., use by the family as a general purpose
car. Since ownership, both legal and equitable, has been held not to be
determinative of control, it would seem that maintenance is the more
important guide in determining control and, hence, in predicting the
family member on whom liability will fall. In taking this view of the
doctrine, North Carolina is in line with the weight of authority.' 9
In the principal case the husband testified that the wife had purchased the car by financing it and that he had never signed a mortgage.
Thus the wife was the purchaser. Since both husband and wife had
made payments on the car, they were both apparently equitable owners.
On the other hand, the wife had not worked for more than two years
prior to the accident, and all the evidence was to the effect that the
husband alone had maintained the car during that time. The majority
"0Although the principal case is the first instance in which the court has been
asked to hold another member of the family under the doctrine for the negligence
of the head of the household, the majority of courts facing the issue have held such
member liable. E.g., .Wyant v. Phillips, 116 W. Va. 207, 179 S.E. 303 (1935);
Turner v. Gackle, 168 Minn. 514, 209 N.W. 626 (1926) ; Smith v. Oversti'eet, 258
Ky. 781, 81 S.W.2d 571 (1935). But see Cewe v. Schuminski, 182 Minn. 126, 233

N.W. 805 (1930).

"6See, e.g., Elliot v. Killian, 242 N.C. 471, 87 S.E.2d 903 (1955).
N.C. 592, 188 S.E. 87 (1936).

10 210
27

238 N.C. 492, 78 S.E.2d 398 (1953).
78 S.E.2d at 404.

18Id.
at 499,

See, e.g., Smith v. Doyle, 98 F.2d 341 (D.C. Cir. 1938) ; Mortensen v. Knight,
81 Ariz. 325, 305 P.2d 463 (1956) ; Cewe v. Schuminski, 182 Minn. 126, 233 N.W.
805 (1930). But see Wyant v. Phillips, 116 W. Va. 207, 179 S.E. 303 (1935),
where the wife was held liable because she owned the car, even though her husband;
who was driving at the time of the accident, maintained and controlled it.
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opinion cited the Matthews case, which, as we have seen, declared that
the test for fixing liability under the family purpose doctrine was control.
Since the evidence dearly showed that the wife had not maintained the
car for more than two years prior to the accident and that the husband
was head of the household, it seems apparent that two of the important
factors in proving control in the wife were lacking. The only evidence
that plaintiff presented to establish control of the car in the wife was the
not very convincing testimony of the defendant's husband: "Yes, my
wife drives.

She uses the car and I use the car too .... I could use

the car anytime that I wanted to."' 20 In allowing the case to go to the
jury on this extremely weak showing of control, it would appear that
the court went beyond established boundaries of the family purpose doctrine as applied in North Carolina. Apparently, under the theory of the
principal case, a showing of little more than legal title in the defendant
will take a case to the jury under the doctrine.
As has been noted, the family member who maintains the car may
be held liable, and the principal case holds an equitable owner liable
under the doctrine. In a proper case, could the equitable owner and the
maintainer be joined on the theory that each exercised some control over
the automobile? In Cronenbergv. United States,21 a federal case applying North Carolina law, the government filed a cross-claim against the
parents of the minor co-defendant who was driving his mother's car, as
joint tort-feasors under the doctrine. G.S. § 20-71.1, presuming agency
on proof of ownership, was used against the wife to establish a prima
facie case. The judge, sitting as a jury, found the question of both
parents' liability under the doctrine to be an issue of fact which he resolved in their favor on the ground that the car was not used for family
purposes. Since the statute only creates a rule of evidence, this holding
assumes that, in legal theory, both parents could have been held responsible under the family purpose doctrine. Thus in North Carolina it
may be that it is possible to recover from both where one family-member
owns the car and another maintains it.2 2 Under the approach of the
principal case, only a slight showing of control in each party is necessary
to take the case to the jury against him.
As has been indicated, the family purpose doctrine is an extension
of respondeat superior. It came into being as an instrument of social
policy to afford greater protection for the rapidly growing number of
20 250

N.C. at 572, 108 S.E.2d at 853.
123 F. Supp. 693 (E.D.N.C. 1954).
The leading case of
2 On this point the authorities are in direct conflict.
Birch v. Abercrombie, 74 Wash. 486, 133 Pac. 1020 (1913), held both husband and
wife on the theory of joint ownership, and Thalman v. Schultze, 111 W. Va. 64,
160 S.E. 303 (1931), held both because the wife owned and the husband maintained the car. Contra, Smith v. Overstreet, 258 Ky. 781, 81 S.W.2d 571 (1935).
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motorists in the United States. The principal case seems to indicate
that the court, in furtherance of the basic policy of the doctrine, does
not wish to impair its utility by imposing technical standards for its use.
Thus, from Small v. Mallory it may be inferred that if there is any
evidence of control in the defendant, it will be sufficient to withstand
his motion of nonsuit on the issue of liability under the family purpose
doctrine.
JAcK W. FLOYD

Constitutional Law-Due Process-Denial of Confrontation to
Witnesses in Loyalty-Security Hearings
The issue of the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses in
loyalty-security hearings was presented to the United States Supreme
Court in the recent case of Greene v. McElroy.' Greene was an aeronautical engineer employed as general manager and vice-president of a
private corporation which was doing classified research for the Navy
under contract. Such contracts incorporated by reference 2 a condition
that the contractor was to exclude from the job all persons not cleared
for access to classified information.
Although Greene had been previously cleared, 3 the corporation was
notified by the Secretary of the Navy in April 1953 that his clearance
was revoked and that he was to be denied access to any classified information. This led to Greene's discharge. He appealed to the Eastern
Industrial Personnel Security Board (EIPSB), and a hearing was held
at which he was subjected to intense cross-examination by the board4
without the opportunity to confront and cross-examine his accusers.
EIPSB affirmed the order of revocation and this action was affirmed by
1360 U.S. 474 (1959).
2 All government contracts for classified work incorporated by reference the
Department of Defense Industrial Security Manual for Safeguarding Classified
Information, 32 C.F.R. § 66 (1954).
' Greene was given a Confidential clearance by the Army in August 1949, a Top
Secret clearance by the Assistant Chief of Staff G-2, Military District of Washington in November 1949, and a Top Secret clearance by the Air Materiel Command
in February 1950. 360 U.S. at 476 n.1. In 1951 Greene's clearance was withdrawn
but was restored by the Industrial Employment Review Board (IERB) in 1952.
In 1953 the Secretary of Defense abolished the Personnel Security Board (PSB)
and the IERB and directed the Secretaries of the three armed services to establish
Regional Industrial Personnel Security Boards. 360 U.S. at 480.
'The revocation of Greene's security clearance was based primarily on incidents
occurring between 1942 and 1947. It was during this period that Greene was living
with his former wife who was alleged to have been an ardent Communist. The
fact that he stayed with her until 1947 seems to be the main reason that the
government suspected that he was a security risk. 360 U.S. at 490. Greene testified that the main reason for the divorce was that his ex-wife held views with which
he did not concur and was friendly with persons with whom he had little in common. 360 U.S. at 479. From a review of the record it appears that Greene's
clearance was revoked because of his association with his wife.

